

Oil revenue management, the deliverance of priority-sector development projects and the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Chad

One of the key premises behind the World Bank's involvement in the exploitation of Chad's oil, and the promotion of its oil revenue management plan were to increase development in one of the world's poorest countries. Since the colonial period, Chad has experienced chronic under-development; first under the French and continued in independence. Located in north-central Africa and two-thirds of the country being in the Sahara and Sahel (and landlocked!), Chad had little to offer on the open market except cotton which was introduced by the French in the 1920s. Additionally, Chad suffers from an under-developed infrastructure which makes the transportation and sale of any goods (agricultural or industrial) both difficult and expensive. Therefore the prospect of billions of dollars generated from oil appeared to be *just what the doctor ordered* in some circles, particularly outside Chad.

In this paper which is part of my thesis, I will examine the workings of development in Chad and determine to what extent the oil industry has impacted both the manner in which development is done, particularly from the standpoint of civil society and local NGOs, and how the oil revenues have affected the rate of socio-economic development. Most analysis of the failure of the Chad Oil Revenue Management Plan centers on the macro issues of lack of transparency and good governance and the resource curse¹ phenomenon but rarely examines the impact of a large but weak local civil society.

The role of the World Bank cannot be overlooked. The World Bank was instrumental in the development of the oil industry by placing its stamp-of-approval on the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project and taking a lead in developing the revenue management plan. But crucially it is the support given to local NGO/CS organizations (capacity-building, acting as a mentor with regard to state-CS relations) where the actions of the Bank are significant. The World Bank argued that local NGO/CS participation in the management of oil revenues was essential to the success of the project in Chad. However, the fact that Chadian civil society was at best a willing and eager sector did not factor into the design of the plan. With only a handful of organizations with the capacity and structure to be a force in Chadian public life, one wonders whether the

¹ For a full discussion on the resource curse debate, see Karl 1997, Auty 1997 & 2001 and Ross 1999 amongst others

World Bank was effectively putting the cart before the horse when designing their revenue management plan. When the World Bank formally pulled-out of the oil project, how did it effect the work of the fledgling Chadian NGO society? Without a third-party oversight entity maintaining constant pressure on the state to act fairly and openly, what is the future of Chadian civil society? What can the people of Chad expect from nearly US\$1 billion per year in rents, taxation and revenues from oil, increased development or an increase in the number of people living at or below the global poverty line? The revenue management plan failed because the World Bank did not take into full consideration the limitations of civil society organizations in Chad before insisting on their integration and participation in the management of oil revenues. Therefore the socio-economic development goals and the monitoring of revenue spending were unlikely to be achieved.

1 Introduction

While not wishing to lay the blame of Chad's economic, political and development woes at the table of colonialism, as is often the case with African researchers, it is vital to point out the role that French colonial policy has played in the current situation. As an insignificant part of the French Equatorial Africa Region (AEF), Chad suffered from inefficient colonial administrators and substandard budgetary allowances in comparison to both the other territories that formed the AEF [Brazzaville (Congo), Oubangui-Chari (Central African Republic) and Gabon], and to the French West Africa Region (AOF). For example, an actual budget was not approved and dispensed for the AEF until the eve of WWII, nearly thirty years after the first budget for the AOF was approved. Administratively the AEF was not deemed to require the full complement of an administrative government and subsequently, one person, the lieutenant (later governor)-general acted as judge and jury for legal matters, made final decisions on appointments, economic and social policy. The differences between the AEF and AOF were obvious with even the AEF Governor-general Merlin calling his charge "Cinderella" (Suret-Canale, 1971). Chad itself was further divided into *le tchad utile* and *le tchad inutile* (ref). these classifications were based on the relatively useful part of Chad located in the extreme south where some agriculture was possible and where the majority of the native groups accepted the French way of life, making the south overall more advantageous to the colonial system than the fiercely resistant central and northern regions.

Chad's economic and development limitations are partially due to its geography and topography. Natural resources are totally dependent on location, type and quality of the land; you either have a naturally occurring resource or you don't. And up until the late colonial period, Chad did not. The absence of the kind of natural resources found in other French African territories (forests, gold) contributed to the underdevelopment of Chad. Of almost equal importance are geographic location and topographical features. Chad, located in north-central Africa, is bordered by Libya to the north, Sudan to the east, Niger and Nigeria to the west, Cameroon to the southwest and the Central African Republic to the south. Fully one half of the country is in the desolate Sahara, about one third in the Sahel and in the South a sliver of the country encompasses the northern most reaches of the Congo River basin and rain forest, the area which is most conducive to agriculture. The topography means that the south with the rivers and fertile land benefited from more development than in the north where these features do not exist. The southern region of Chad was therefore seen as more beneficial to France and its economic and trade ambitions. It is in the southern area of the country where the majority of crops are found (including cotton, the chief agricultural industry in Chad), including the majority of oil deposits. Chad also has a fledgling brewing and bottling industry which primarily serves the domestic market. It is important to note that most economic activity is geared towards the domestic market, with cotton and oil being the two resources of value on the open market.

2 Methodology

This study draws from fieldwork conducted over a four month period (July-August 2007 and February-April 2009) with the exception of one interview conducted at World Bank headquarters in Washington, DC. Several methods were used to collect data: structured and semi-structured interviews, informal interviews, group semi-structured discussions and participant observation. The structured and semi-structured interviews typically lasted about one hour and were primarily conducted in an office setting. The informants represented local civil society leaders, members of the international NGOs, government officials and World Bank officials. Some of the informants in this category were interviewed more than once (i.e. in 2007 and 2009) which provided an understanding of any changes in the environment over time, particularly since there were several political shocks between the two visits that had an impact on the work of civil society organizations. Informal interviews/discussions took place in a variety of settings including church, people's homes, restaurants and bars. These varied in duration from 10-15 minutes up to several hours. This

information often elicited the %unofficial+stance but more often was utilised in conjunction with participant observation to compare what was said with how things were, as frequently the two were not the same.

Fieldwork took place in the capital, N'Djamena and in the oil-producing region of Doba-Bebedjia and the surrounding villages. These locations were chosen because civil society activity related to the oil project primarily took place in these areas. Additionally, the two sites allowed for differences between state-civil society relations at the national and local level. The majority of data collection took place in N'Djamena. One week was spent in the oil-producing region observing not only the operations of the oil companies but also the nature of their relationships with the local populations. I conducted all interviews in French however in the villages local dialect was used. In these cases, a research assistant who was from the area was employed as a translator.

3 Current State of Development

Today, the economic picture appears promising however the economy is dominated by the oil industry and when compared with the economic state at independence in 1960 (Table 2) it does not paint an accurate view of the current economic situation in Chad (Table 1), particularly if the statistics related to oil are removed which would illustrate that if the oil revenues had not begun flowing in 2003, the economic situation in Chad would have hardly changed in over 40 years. For instance, the GDP is nearly \$6.5 billion of which about \$4 billion is derived from the oil industry (WB rep in Chad)². This means that all other imports & exports combined earn the country \$2.5 billion/year. Natural resources (predominantly oil) make up 38.2% of GDP whilst agriculture and other industries account for 61.8% of GDP, meaning natural resources accounts for two-thirds of GDP while making up less than half of the total output. *Per capita* income for 2008 is projected to be \$1,670.12 (IMF 2008)³ in a country that is ranked 170 out of 175 in the current UNDP Human Development Indicators (2007-08).

Table 1	Economic overview (current)
GDP (2007 est)	\$6.426 billion
Natural Resources	Petroleum, natron (sodium carbonate), kaolin, gold, bauxite, tin, tungsten, titanium, iron ore

² This includes revenues and taxes.

³ This is based on 2004 figures.

Agriculture (2006 est) 35.2% GDP	Cotton, gum arabic, livestock, fish, peanuts, millet, sorghum, rice, sweet potatoes, cassava, dates, manioc.	30% arable land
Industry (2006 est) 26.6% GDP	meat-packing, beer brewing, soap, cigarettes, construction materials, natron mining, soft-drink bottling	
Services (2006) GDP	40.8%	
Trade	<i>Exports:</i> (f.o.b. 2007) \$4,219 million	oil, cotton, livestock, gum Arabic
	<i>Major markets</i> (1999)	Portugal, Germany, Thailand, Costa Rica, South Africa, France, Nigeria, Cameroon
	<i>Imports:</i> (f.o.b., 2007 est.) \$1,157.3 million	petroleum products, machinery and transportation equipment, foodstuffs, industrial goods, textiles
	<i>Major suppliers</i> (2004)	U.S., France, Cameroon, Nigeria
Central government budget (2006 est.)	<i>Revenues</i> --\$617.3 million	<i>Expenditures</i> --\$877.6 million

US Dept of State Chad: country background, August 2008

Table 2 Chad economic indicators compared with other LL countries, using SSA statistics as a basis for comparison (O'Connell, 2008:3)

Country	Average growth in real GDP per capita (1961-2000)	Percentage share in total SSA		
		Population (1960)	GDP (1960)	Ratio of GDP per capita to SSA average (1960)
Chad	-0.72	1.40	1.22	0.80
LL Group	0.31	28.61	15.83	0.58

SSA . Sub-Saharan Africa, LL - Landlocked

It is not hard to deduce that the increase due to oil revenues has not been effectively distributed to the wider population; however, there are a few signs of development. During my research visit in July 2007, in N'Djamena, there was some evidence of infrastructural (a handful of single lane paved roads, a couple of intersections with traffic lights that were no working) improvements but no projects in place that would indicate the country was experiencing an economic windfall. There has been more significant development in oil-producing region, Doba (Table 3), which would support Azamsqearlier argument that those living in the industrial area benefit from said industry.

Table 3: Example of Oil Revenues allocated to Oil-producing region

Projects: Oil-Producing Region	Cost, CFA
Water distribution system, Doba	443,500,000
Construction of high school, Doba	786,500,000
Extension of primary school, Doba	90,000,000
Construction of marketplace, Bébédjia	1,897,245,000
Equipment for High school, Bébédjia	216,000,000
Fence around primary school, Bébédjia	213,000,000
TOTAL	3,646,245,000
Source: Coordination Nationale Projet Doba-Comité Provisoire; October 2005	World Bank Group 2006

On the surface one could argue that the oil revenues have been utilised for improvements in socio-economic development, however on my visit to Doba-Bebédjia in Spring 2009 a different story unfolded. The permanent market in Doba was not being used, most people were still awaiting regular access to water in Doba and in the surrounding villages modern schools were vacant because the budgets for these projects only include the construction or provision of materials not the maintenance or the personnel required. In most cases the onus was on the local population to provide salary and housing for teachers, as was the case in the village of Galaba in the heart of the oil production area. As you approach the village, you pass a beautiful, pristine primary school which has never been used. The village elders said that after it was built they were told that as part of the partnership between locals and Esso, they would be responsible for providing a teacher⁴. This is one of the poorest villages in the region. The population survives on subsistence farming and is not capable of recruiting and paying for school teachers. Furthermore, the village elders said they were unaware of this partnership; if they had known the state would not provide a teacher and materials they would have requested the money be used for a new well⁵. Therefore the children do not use the school but instead are taught by former pupils in a traditional village setting without any support from the state. This is the case throughout Chad and begs the question whether the approved development projects can be classified as an increase in the well-being of the general population. It is essential to remember that if this is the case in the oil-producing region, what is the situation in the rest of the country where there is no guarantee of receiving oil money?

3.1 Revenue allocation for development

⁴ Interview on 13 March 2009

⁵ Ibid

The initial oil revenue management plan of 1999 that became Chadian Law 001 stipulated that direct revenues (royalties, dividends) would be used to combat poverty called the Priority Sectors (Table 4). However in October 2005, President Idriss Deby Itno declared the state's need to amend the law in order to include security in the Priority Sectors due to an increase in rebel activity against his government. Though against the wishes of the both the World Bank and the local civil society, Deby changed the law in December 2005 which led to a 4-month stand-off between Deby and the World Bank which responded by freezing the bank account and restricting access to funds in London (IRIN). Finally in May 2005, just before the presidential elections, the World Bank conceded and a new plan was agreed. The revised plan saw the elimination of the FGF and an overall decrease in funds directed towards the Priority Sectors (Table 4).

Table 4: Comparison of the original Law 001 and its revision

Law 001 (1999)	Revision of Law 001 (2005/06)
-10% of direct oil revenues placed in Future Generations Fund (FGF)	-70% of Chad's entire budget (oil & other resources) for poverty-reduction
-80% of royalties & 85% of dividends devoted to Priority Sectors	-65% for Priority Sector
-5% of royalties for the oil-producing region	-5% for Oil-producing region
-15% of direct oil revenues to the general budget until 31 Dec 2007, then will go to Priority Sector	

The result is a 15% reduction in the amount allocated to development; the only number that remains untouched is the allocation to the oil-producing region. Unprecedented pressure from all areas of civil society were successful in retaining a set budget line for the oil-producing region which is more due to political concerns that the president feeling any responsibility to the Doba region.

The impact of the reduction of funds allocated for poverty-reduction has been somewhat difficult to see because there are, for instance, more paved roads in Chad since 2003, better access to electricity in Doba and N'Djamena, large-scale projects such as football stadiums, new school buildings and permanent markets. Whereas if you look closer access to potable water has hardly increased, electricity is actually

available haphazardly and the brand new schools stand empty because the funds were not budgeted for the maintenance of staff or the purchase of materials. So the obvious questions are asked: has oil increased the quality and quantity of development projects or has it been the feared curse?

3.3 Priority Sectors and Development Goals

The primary use of oil revenues is to increase development capacity in the key priority sectors: health, education, rural development, infrastructure, and the environment (IFC report). As can be seen in Table 4, prior to the revisions of Law 001, the state did agree to expenditures in the priority sectors with Agriculture, Chad's traditional export commodity, actually receiving 104% allocated to it. Operating Costs was the only other sector to have 100% of its allocations approved whereas the Ministry of Petroleum was only approved for 43.60%. What this tells us is that the money was allocated and approved by the CCSRP. More important is what it does not tell us: did the funds translate to actual projects or did the money simply disappear?

Table 4⁶: Example of Budget allocations for the Priority Sectors prior to the law revision

Priority Sector 2005	Expenditures of	Oil Revenues
Ministry	Revised Allocations*	Outlays approved by Collège as % of allocation
Public Works & Transport	33,620,117,000	95.70%
Primary Education	10,694,990,000	73.30%
Public Health	10,620,985,000	74.30%
Agriculture	9,099,271,000	104.10%
Mines and Energy	8,200,000,000	99.40%
Higher Education	5,084,200,000	91.20%
Operating Expenses	3,000,000,000	100.00%
Urban Development	2,928,000,000	94.10%
Environment and Water	1,601,677,000	93.30%
Social and Family Action	1,420,260,000	71.90%
Animal Husbandry/Livestock	1,050,000,000	95.90%
Ministry of Petroleum	550,000,000	43.60%
Total	87,869,500,000	90.70%

⁶ Due to the political situation in Chad and the departure of the World Bank from the Project, it is difficult to obtain the most recent budget information.

Amounts in CFAF (US\$ 1 approximately equivalent to 542 CFAF) As of December 31, 2005	SOURCE: Collège de Contrôle et de Surveillance des Ressources Pétrolières	World Bank Group 2006
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Compare this to the budget allocations for 2009 and it is clear to see that the focus has shifted away from the original priority sectors (Table 6). With the rebel activities in last 2005 to the march towards the capital in April 2006, and the attempted coup in February 2008, the state has justified this shifted. Both the ministries of public health and national education have a combined 143,128 CFAF which is slightly more than the budget for the ministry of finances.

Table 6: Biggest beneficiaries of the 2009 budget

Ministry	Amount (millions of CFAF)
Finance	142,262
Infrastructure	136,558
National Defense	101,003
National Education	84,894
Public Health	55,234

Chad Ministry of Finance 2008

According to a leading member of the civil society community, the state increase in infrastructure forms a part of the overall national security objective: improving roads in order to facilitate military transportation⁷, further testament that the government places less importance on the fight against poverty.

4 NGOs, development and oil

The World Bank insisted on a greater role for civil society in the management of oil revenues, both for reasons of transparency and wider participation. In the 1999 agreement, the World Bank advocated for the creation of a permanent oversight body which would include members of the civil society. This body became the *Collège de Contrôle et de Surveillance des Ressources Pétrolières* (the College or CCSRP). This follows the World Bank's shift from reliance on technical expertise prior to the 1990s to advocating the participatory development approach beginning in the 1990s (Murphy, 2005), which was part of the overall shift in development from a top-down approach to development experts recognizing the importance of local knowledge.

⁷ Interview 18 February 2009

The CCSRP consists of nine members representing National Assembly representative, Senate, the Supreme Court, the Ministries of Treasury and Petrol, and the national director of the BEAC-Central African Bank, as well as one person from each of the following civil society sectors: development NGOs, religious communities and unions (CCSRP). In order to maintain a semblance of transparency members of the College are elected (from their particular constituencies) for a three-year term, renewable once time, for a maximum of six years (Reglement Interieur du College, 2002). The College helps to insure budgetary transparency in that all line items and payment requests using of oil revenues must be approved by them. However, the College does not have the authority to propose projects or remove proposed development projects from the list; all programming decisions are taken either by the National Assembly or the Presidency, the College only has the power to approve/refuse payment. As narrow as the remit of the College is in Western eyes, in the Chadian case it is a major step forward for civil society for it marks the first time that the government has some sort of check on its power that is stipulated by law. However, with the parliament dominated by the party of the president rarely does an instance occur where the governments program is not accepted. Furthermore, with four of the nine members of the CCSRP coming from various government agencies, it is not often that budgetary requests are rejected. This is the case even more since the departure of the World Bank from the oil project in September 2008 (WB Chad-Cameroon Project site). Ahead of my latest visit to Chad, there was a question as to whether or not the departure of the World Bank meant the end, effectively, of the CCSRP however as of April 2009 the government has not dissolved it. Most conversations with civil society organizations concluded that they expected the government to curtail the power of civil society, including the possible disbandment of the CCSRP⁸. One leading member of a civil society organization stressed that the process of the state rolling back the power of the College will be accelerated with the departure of the World Bank+(Interview, 2009). In the section below, I demonstrate that the rights of civil society organizations have been strictly limited, by law, since 1962 thereby demonstrating that this latest trend is merely a continuation of the restrictive nature of the state. In 1962, Decrees 165 and 166 along with Ordinance 27 defined how civil organizations would be managed regulated, and except for the Protocol Accord Standard devised in 1989, civil society organizations continue to be governed by these 40-year old

⁸ These conversations took place between February-April 2009 in Ndjamena and Doba.

laws, which themselves are based on a law from 1901. Working under laws that are virtually unchanged in 40 years is a reflection of how the state views the importance of civil society. Chadian politics are such that the state curtails nearly all opposition to its power. The excerpts from the 1962 laws governing the rights of membership, rights of formation and restrictions on the type of work/activities civil society organizations prove that even at the dawn of independence, the president/state were keen to insure that all civil society activities were strictly limited.

Decree 165 states:

During meetings of the office, meetings or general meetings of an association, it should not be covered any subject apart from the object of the formation of association, such as it appears in the statutes. An official report must be written in the register of the official reports. (Decree 165, Article 8, translated)

The public utility of an association can be to him recognized if it is estimated that its goal is the moral or physical greater comfort of the population in some field that it is. The request for recognition of public utility must be addressed, on stamped paper with 100 francs with the President of the Republic, by the channel of the prefect or the direction of the national security and the Minister of Interior Department. The recognition of public utility will be the subject of a decree taken in the Council of Ministers. (Decree 165, Article 15, translated)

Ordinance 27 states:

Association is the convention by which two or several natural persons or morals share full liking and with full knowledge of the facts, in a permanent way and for a rather long time, their knowledge or their activities with a given aim other to share benefit (Article 1, translated)

*Any association founded on a cause or for a contrary object with the laws, the moralities or **the purpose of which would be or would give only the possibility of attacking the integrity of the national territory, to the constitution or the shape of government, is null full.*** (Article 2, translated)

The members of a not declared association will be punished of a one month imprisonment at one year and of a fine of 50.000 with 500.000francs or one of these sorrows only. The infringements in article 5 will be punished same sorrows. The extenuating circumstances and the deferment will not be able to in no case to be granted.

Associations which are of this fact in infringement will be dissolved and the seizure as well as the confiscation with the profit of the Treasury of their goods will be carried out. (Article 6, translated)

The law of July 1, 1901 on associations as well as the texts which supplemented it and modified, are repealed. (Article 15, translated)

According to these laws, civil society organizations are not allowed to petition or challenge the state *juris prudence* nor hold any meeting without providing full disclosure of all items discussed to the state. How, then, did the World Bank think civil society organizations would be able to insure that millions of dollars in oil

revenues would be spent as prescribed? On first glance, one could argue that the designers of the management plan were ignorant of these laws however, upon further investigation, this is not the case; the World Bank had been made aware of the limitations of Chadian civil society but chose to push forward with the project anyway (Interview, 2009).

In addition to the CCSRP, there are a growing number of national and local civil society groups and NGOs in Chad (CEFOD, 2007) with the largest increase in those directly interested and involved in issues surrounding the oil project. However, unlike the CCSRP, these organizations do not enjoy the same level of autonomy and protection under the law as the CCSRP, which greatly curtails their effectiveness particularly vis-à-vis the state. One of the primary differences is the manner in which each entity is regulated; while the CCSRP is largely autonomous and protected by parliamentary law (001), national and local civil society organizations are bound to legislative decrees from the immediate post-colonial period (as described above). Furthermore, Chadian NGOs and CSOs are limited in that they are totally reliant on either the state or international donors for funds. Unlike in other parts of Africa where a middle class is present, or even countries with a sizeable Diaspora in Europe or the United States that regularly supports activities at home, CSOs in Chad cannot generate their own funds, so are further crippled in their capacity to affect development. According to IntermonOxfam in N'Djamena, the government will not award funds to local NGOs citing a lack of proven ability to produce results and to manage large sums of money⁹. The international donors cite the same concerns however neither entity is doing much to improve local capacity and thereby strengthen local civil society so remains both independent and dependent as well as strictly limited in their ability to effectively participate in development activities. To the credit of the international NGO (INGO) community, they have created a forum to support their local partners¹⁰ by jointly submitting project proposals to both the state and international donors and acting as the guarantor for project implementation. Once a grant has been approved, the INGO puts together a series of workshops with the goal of increasing the knowledge of local partners in accountancy, reporting, project management, etc. In this way, local CSOs are able to strengthen their capacity to both request grant funds and implement successful projects. This, unfortunately, appears to be only partially successful in that increased funds for local projects implemented by local organizations has barely increased whereas,

⁹ Series of interviews at IntermonOxfam in February 2009

¹⁰ Ibid

organizations are more likely to obtain funds outside of Chad. With regards to the oil project, the end result has been a growing number of local NGOs and CSOs granted the right to exist but are cannot fully contribute to fight against poverty due to their limited ability to procure oil revenues from the state, which means the World Banksq desire for a strong local NGO/CSO presence has not been achieved.

5 Conclusion

What does this mean for the state of local NGO participation in development? If we accept that the World Banksqrevolutionary oil revenue management plan failed, what can the Chadian case provide to future petro-states in Africa in order to prevent the same outcomes? Most agree that, in theory, Chadsqoil revenue management plan was strong and it would go a long way to preventing the %esource curse+from infecting the country. The plan addressed all major concerns of the local community leaders as well as the international actors: transparency, specific budget allocations to priority sectors, provisions for the oil-producing region and future generations. However, the primary flaw appears to be the rush to implement the plan and establish the oil industry. When I asked members of the local civil society if the departure of the World Bank from the oil project in September 2008 was a pivotal event in state-civil society relations, I was told %no+¹¹ that they were prepared for this eventuality because of events from previous years. Astonishingly, I was told that a group of civil society members petitioned the World Bank to delay start of the oil project in 1999 citing the lack of transparency and management measures not being in place¹², proving the World Bank was made aware of the political situation in Chad before the exploration of oil began. The World Bank countered that the extreme poverty of the Chad meant there could be no delay in starting the oil project citing the oil revenues would boost the country and their confidence in the state to continue establishing good governance measures even after oil revenues began flowing into the accounts¹³. It is surprising to think the World Bank would put so much trust in a government that came to power on the back of a violent *coup d'etat* and for the first six years in existence exhibited many of the same repressive patterns that have plagued the country since 1965. The word of the current president was all the assurance the international community had, and that sufficed.

¹¹ Series of interviews in February and March 2009

¹² Interview 28 February 2009

¹³ Ibid

With the exception of the CCSRP, history has shown that any management plan that hinged on the cooperation between the state and the civil society organizations was almost doomed to fail. As has been demonstrated, the state has consistently curtailed the power of non-state actors in order to prevent and opposition to the state. If the Banksqplan was to be successful, full acknowledgement of the historical relationship between the state and civil society was required. Further, it should have insisted that the mechanisms of economic transparency and management of revenues were in place prior to the launch of the oil project. In this way, more than six years after the first barrels of oil left Doba and the country received its first revenues, Chad could be experiencing a growth in socio-economic development and possibly on its way to avoiding the resource curse. Instead is a country which to the casual observer showing signs of improvement (more paved roads, better access to electricity, new buildings) but is actually falling further below the poverty line. Local organizations continue to work towards change but with the current regime becoming more and more repressive (particularly since the crackdown following the incidents of February 2008), most do not foresee a return to the rights gained prior to 2008 unless there is a regime change or pressure from the international community¹⁴.

Implications for future African petro-states such as Ghana, it is imperative that lessons are learnt from the Chadian case. Otherwise we will see the same pattern repeating itself resulting in regarding oil as a curse rather than the blessing it could be with thorough planning and consultation, and with the requisite political will of the state.

¹⁴ Interview 28 February 2008

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- Chad Decree** A.1.3 Décret n°166/INT-SUR du 25 août 1962, portant modalités d'application de l'ordonnance n°27/INT/SUR DU 28 juillet 1962 réglementant les associations étrangères

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